According to the summary (I have not been able to track down a full copy of the Judgment yet), the mother was given permission to relocate. This was conditional upon her obtaining an order from the Russian court enshrining the contact proposals the court had accepted as being in the child’s interests.
Lord Justice Wilson (as he then was) observed in Re R (Leave to Remove: Contact)  EWCA Civ 1137,  1 FLR 1336 the tension between granting a parent permission to relocate, but then attaching to that permission a contact order. He said (at para ):
“Although a contact order is, as I have noticed, now occasionally made by way of attachment to a grant of leave, it is contrary to principle. A contact order would be an order taking effect until further order of the English court. But, on a grant of leave, the English court is, if only for practical reasons, surrendering its control over the child to the foreign court … [I]t would of course be to the court in Perth that the father would turn; for any further order of the English court would not have effect in Australia. With the leave of the English court, he would be likely to present the judge’s judgment to the judge in Perth and seek an order for contact with L along the lines therein set out … this court [does not] automatically require a foreign, mirror order to be in place before the child leaves England and Wales. In the circumstances in which the court has some doubt about the applicant’s bona fides in relation to the other parent’s contact, that precaution is often taken; but, in circumstances, like the present, in which the judge reached the firmest conclusion about the mother’s commitment to contact, it would not be usual to put her to the expense and delay of obtaining a mirror order.”
Late last year, the 1996 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children (‘the Hague PR Convention’) entered into force in this country.
The Convention is intended to harmonise the approach between Contracting States on matters affecting – as its title suggests – the protection of children. It does this in relation to matters of jurisdiction (which country’s courts and agencies should take measures to protect children), applicable law (which rules of law they ought to apply when doing so) and recognition and enforcement (the intention being a measure taken in one Contracting State should almost always be recognised in another).